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The Classical Continuum without
Points
Geo¤rey Hellman and Stewart Shapiro
Abstract
We develop a point-free construction of the classical one-
dimensional continuum, with an interval structure based on mere-
ology and either a weak set theory or logic of plural quantica-
tion. In some respects this realizes ideas going back to Aristotle,
although, unlike Aristotle, we make free use of classical "actual
innity". Also, in contrast to intuitionistic, Bishop, and smooth
innitesimal analysis, we follow classical analysis in allowing par-
titioning of our "gunky line" into mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive disjoint parts, thereby demonstrating the independence of
"indecomposability" from a non-punctiform conception. It is
surprising that such simple axioms as ours already imply the
Archimedean property and that they determine an isomorphism
with the Dedekind-Cantor structure of R as a complete, separa-
ble, ordered eld. We also present some simple topological models
of our system, establishing consistency relative to classical analy-
sis. Finally, after describing how to nominalize our theory, we
close with comparisons with earlier e¤orts related to our own.
.
1 Introduction
Since Aristotle[1], many mathematicians and philosophers have expressed
the view that a genuine continuum cannot be composed of points. Re-
lated to this is the idea, also Aristotles, that a true continuum is "seam-
less" or "indecomposable": it shouldnt be possible to break it apart
cleanly, to separate outa proper part from the rest.
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Of course, the mainstream Cantor-Dedekind theory, along with the
set-theoretic tradition, respects neither of these properties. But alter-
natives, such as the intuitionist and Bishop conceptions and smooth
innitesimal analysis ("SIA"), dont respect both of these either: they
clearly have points. On the intuitionistic or Bishop constructions, the
continuum is entirely made up of points, although these have to be de-
termined by constructive Cauchy sequences of rationals, not arbitrary
such sequences. SIA has points galore but it entertains (without as-
serting the existence of) nilsquare and nilpotent innitesimals forming a
micro-neighborhood4 (of 0, translatable anywhere along the smooth
line), behaving as a mini-line (linelet) that can be translated and ro-
tated but not bent, i.e. an axiom sitipulates that any (smooth) function
dened on 4 obeys the equation of a straight line. (Its slope at any
locus on the smooth line gives the derivative of the function there.)1
Both these alternative approaches, however, do respect indecompos-
ability, in that they forswear recognition of any function that would take,
say, a constant value on one segment of the line and another constant
value on the rest. And this, in turn, is achieved by giving up the law of
excluded middle, i.e. by restricting the background logic to be intuiti-
ionistic. (The rationales o¤ered by intuitionism and SIA, respectively,
di¤er greatly, but the e¤ects are quite similar in a number of respects,
indecompsability counting as one of them.)
It would be wonderful to present Aristotle with these developments.
We will leave it to scholars (and imaginative script-writers) to conjecture
what he might have said. But the modern-day classicist, and perhaps
many an impartial observer, might say that indecomposability is being
achievedonly in a negative sense, that is, by depriving oneself of the
logical means of distinguishing in the sense stipulated, viz. via total 2-
valued functions one part of the line (or respective lines they recognize)
from the rest.2 Our approach, developed in this paper, will decidedly not
1See Bell [2] for details on the development of SIA. Bell explicitly motivates SIA
by expressions of dissatisfaction with point-based analyses of continua, and insists
that the nilpotent innitesimals of SIA are not to be conceived as further points. Just
why not is not entirely clear, however. Perhaps it is because they (if they exist
something that cannot be proved or refuted in SIA) would be too indenite as to
location or extent to be thought of as points. Perhaps also they are collectively to
be thought of as a kind of gluethat holds the more denite points of the smooth
line together.
2We are not saying that the restriction to intuitionistic logic is not well-motivated
from the perspectives of intuitionism and SIA, but merely that indecomposability fol-
lows from the restriction in that it prevents recognizing any discontinuous functions.
Indecomposability does not emerge from an analysis of the continuum and its con-
stituents. It should be noted, however, that indecomposability takes di¤erent forms
in intuitionism and SIA: the indecomposable subsets of the smooth line correspond
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respect indecomposability; however, unlike all three approaches already
mentioned, it will be truly non-punctiform. Points or numbers will be
constructed (in several ways); however they will be clearly seen as our
additional superstructureto a thoroughly non-punctiform line.3 More-
over, in one version of this approach, points will only be recognized as
possible additional structure, which seems quite in accordance with
Aristotles conception. Our approach may thus reasonably be called
semi-Aristotelian.
2 Atomless Mereological Continuum
The system developed in this paper is designed to characterize a one-
dimensional continuum consisting of regionsas parts, including intervals
although, as will be explained, the notions of open, closed, and half-
openare not available in our system. This continuum does not have any
points as parts, although we will be able to dene point in terms of
intervals. Once we have proved that our continuum is Archimedean, we
will demonstrate that it is isomorphic to the classical Dedekind-Cantor
continuum, as a complete, separable, linearly ordered eld.
Our formalism consists of classical rst-order logic with equality sup-
plemented with a standard axiom system for second-order logic (or logic
of plural quantication, with an unrestricted comprehension axiom for
plurals4), and with an adaptation of the standard (Tarski) axioms of
mereology together with (something implying) the Atomlessaxiom.
Axioms of Mereology:
1a. Axioms on x  y (x is part of y): reexive, anti-symmetric,
transitive.
Certain of our axioms and theorems are conveniently stated in terms of
a binary relation called overlaps: x overlaps y: x  y ,df 9z(z  x
^ z  y):
1b. Axiom on  and : x  y $ 8z[z  x! z  y]:
to a proper sub-class of the subsets of the intuitionist continuum indecomposable
there. Cf, Bell [3].
3We postpone a comparison with more recent constructions along similar lines
until the nal section, below.
4This looks very much like second-order logical comprehension for monadic pred-
icates, except that it is conditional upon there being something satisfying the predi-
cate. It may be written:
9v(	(v))! 9xx8y[y  xx$ 	(y)];
where y  xxis read y is one of (or is among) the xx, and where 	 is any formula
of the language lacking free xx.
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Theorem 1: Axioms 1a and 1b imply the Extensionality Principle:
x = y $ 8z[z  x$ z  y]:
Proof: From left to right is trivial. (Take y as x; then substitute y for
the second x.) From right to left: Assume the right of Extensionality
and rewrite it as the conjunction of two conditionals: 8z[z x! x  y]^
8z[z  y ! z  x]: By Axiom 1b, the rst of these yields x  y, and the
second yields y  x: By anti-symmetry of , the conjunction of these is
equivalent to x = y:
2. Fusion or whole comprehension: 9u(u) ! [9x8yfy  x $
9z((z) ^ z  y)g], where  is a predicate of the second-order language
(or language of plurals) lacking free x.5
At this point, we could add an Atomless axiom: 8x9y(y < x), where
y < x$df y  x & y 6= x (read y is a proper part of x). But this will
follow from a stronger condition imposed below on the interval structure
of our pointlessor gunkyline (axiom 5.).
We write x + y for the mereological sum or fusion of x and y ; such
that 8z[z  x + y $ (z  x _ z  y)], and we use P1n=0 xn to designate
fusions of innitely many things. Also, if 9z(z  x ^ z  y); then we
write x ^ y for the meet of x and y, which satises 8z[z  x ^ y $ z  x
^ z  y]: (If x and y have no common part, x ^ y is undened.) And we
write xjy for :9z[z  x ^ z  y], pronounced x is discrete from y (and
vice versa). Furthermore, if 9z(z x ^ :(z  y)); then x  y is that part
of x which does not overlap y, viz. 8z[z  x  y $ (z  x ^ :(z  y))]:(If
there is no such z, then x  y is undened.) By axiom 2, fusions always
exist, and meets and di¤erences also exist wherever dened.
The pointless line we wish to characterize well labelG, for gunky.6
Below, well prove that (quite remarkably) our very elementary axioms
su¢ ce to characterize G precisely as a certain minimal closure; and then
5The formulation in language of plurals takes this form:
8uuf9w(w  uu)! 9x8y[y  x$
9z(z  uu & z  y)]g,
where uuis a plural variable, w  uuis read w is one of the uu. (If plural variables
are assumed to have instances, then the antecedent and the main conditional can be
omitted.)
6The technical term gunk for the stu¤ of atomless mereology stems from
Lewis.[10, 1991]
Note that, by taking  in Axiom 2 as x = x, a universal individual exists. Since,
in what follows, we will nd useful it to introduce a denumerable innity of atoms to
serve the role of natural numbers (i.e. the atoms with the usual operations dened
on them collectively form an N-structure, i.e. satisfy the Dedekind axioms), we do
not identify the universal object with G:
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well prove that, with its interval structure, G is isomorphic to the clas-
sical real-numbers structure, R.. The point, of course, of having the
Atomless condition is to insure that, literally, G contains no points at
all. Thus, except where we explicitly refer to atoms of an N-structure,
the range of our rst-order and plural variables can be thought of as all
the parts of G, which we also call regions.
It is convenient to introduce a geometric primitive, L(x; y) , to mean
x is (entirely) to the left of y. The axioms for L specify that it is
irreexive, asymmetric, and transitive. And we dene R(x; y), x is
(entirely) to the right of y, as L(y; x):
Now we can introduce an important geometric relation, betweenness:
Betw(x; y; z) for y is (entirely) between x and z:
Betw(x; y; z),df [L(x; y) ^ R(z; y)] _ [R(x; y) ^ L(z; y)]
It follows that Betw(x; y; z)$ Betw(z; y; x):
L(x; y) obeys the following axioms:
3a. L(x; y) _ R(x; y)! xjy. (Of course, xjy implies x 6= y:)
3b. L(x; y) $ 8z; u[ z  x ^ u  y ! L(z; u)]:
The following can now be inferred:
Betw(x; y; z)! xjy & yjz & xjz; and
Betw(x; y; z) ^ Betw(u; x; z)! Betw(u; y; z);
where the transitivity of L is used for the latter.
Now we can dene an essential notion, that of a connected part of
G. Intuitively, such a part has no gaps. The denition is straightfor-
ward:
Conn(x),df 8y; z; u[z; u  x ^ Betw(z; y; u)! y  x]: (Df Conn)
(Anything lying between any two parts of x is also a part of x.)
Furthermore, we can dene what it means for a connected part of G
to be bounded: Let Conn(p): then
Bounded(p),df 9x; y[Conn(x) ^ Conn(y) & Betw(x; p; y):
(Df Bounded)
(A connected region wholly between two others is bounded.) Once we
establish that G is bi-innite, i.e. innite in both directions, it will fol-
llow that, for connected regions, boundedness is a necessary condition
for nite in extent, as commonly understood. And once we have es-
tablished that G is Archimedean, it will follow that boundedness is also
su¢ cient for nite in extent.
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We call bounded connected regions intervals and write Int(j),
etc., when needed. However, note that, lacking points, we cannot de-
scribe intervals as either openor closed, or half-open.
Using L; we can impose a condition of dichotomy for discrete inter-
vals:
4. Dichotomy axiom: 8i; j[i; j are two discrete intervals! (L(i; j)
_ L(j; i))]:
Now we can prove a linearity condition among intervals:
Theorem 2 (Linearity): Let x; y; z be any three pairwise discrete inter-
vals; then exactly one of x; y; z is between the other two.
Proof. Applying Dichotomy to the hypothesis, assume that (say) L(x; y):
If also L(y; z); then R(z; y); so that Betw(x; y; z); and this is unique. If
instead L(z; y); then either L(z; x); in which case we have Betw(z; x; y),
uniquely; or L(x; z), in which case we have Betw(x; z; y), also uniquely.
The argument from assuming at rst that R(x; y) is similar.
To guarantee that arbitrarily small intervals exist everywhere along G,
we adopt the following axiom:
5. 8x9j[Int(j) & j < x]:7
An important relation of two intervals is adjacency, which is de-
ned as follows:
Adj(j; k),df jjk ^ @m[Betw(j;m; k)]: (Df Adjacent)
Now suppose that j = 1i=1ji; where Int(ji) and R(ji+1; ji) and
Adj(ji+1; ji): Then we write R(k; j) just in case 8i[R(k; ji); analogously
for L(k; j): This will be useful in the proof of Theorem 3, below.
The following equivalence relations on intervals will also prove use-
ful: j and k are left-end equivalentjust in case 9p[p  j & p  k ^
@q(fq  j_ q  kg & L(q; p)]: Right-end equivalentis dened analo-
gously.
One further geometric primitive is very useful both in insuring that
G is innite in extent and in recovering, in e¤ect, the rational numbers
as a countable, dense subset of the (arithmetic) continuum, viz. con-
gruence, as a binary relation among intervals. Intuitively, Cong(i; j) is
intended to mean the lengths of intervals i and j are equal. Thus,
we adopt the usual rst-order axioms specifying that Cong is an equiv-
alence relation. We will sometimes write this as jij = jjj ; but with the
understanding that we have not yet given any meaning to jijstanding
7This of course implies the Atomless axiom, introduced above.
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alone, but only in certain whole contexts. Similarly, for intervals i; j; we
can dene, contextually, jij < jjj as meaning: 9j0[j0 an interval ^ j0 < j
^ Cong(i; j0)]; and we may write jij > jjj as equivalent to jjj < jij : Our
next axiom will guarantee that these comparisons make general sense.
We come now to a key axiom, crucial to our characterization of G:
6. Translation axiom: Given any two intervals, i and j, each is
congruent both to a unique left-end-equivalent and to a unique right-
end-equivalent of the other.
In e¤ect, this guarantees that a given length can be transported(more
accurately, instantiated) anywhere along G, and that these instances are
unique as congruent and either left- or right-end equivalent to the given
length. In particular, we can prove
Lemma 1 Given any two intervals i and j such that :Cong(i; j), either
there exists an interval i0 < j with Cong(i; i0);or there exists i0 with
j < i0 with Cong(i; i0):
Proof. By :Cong(i; j); i 6= j: Assume that :(i0 < j) for any i0 such that
Cong(i; i0): By the Translation axiom, there exists i0 such that Cong(i; i0)
and i0 is left-end-equivalent to j: We want to show that j  i0 ; as that
will establish that j < i0; as desired. Assume the contrary, i.e. that
j  i0: Now, if i0   j doesnt exist, then, by denition, i0  j: But, since
Cong(i; i0); we have :Cong(i0; j); whence i0 6= j; and then we would
have i0 < j; contrary to hypothesis. So assume some n  i0   j: By the
hypothesis for reductio, there is also k  j & k  i0; and indeed :(k  i0):
Without loss of generality, we may assume that k is an interval. (See
axiom 5.) Since i0 is left-end-equivalent to j, it follows that k is not left-
end-equivalent to j: But there is m  j   k which is left-end equivalent
to both j and i0 so satises m  i0: Let m0 be a common part of m and
i0: Clearly L(m0; k): But :(L(n; k)); since if it were, it would overlap j,
contrary to assumption. (n cant be left of j; since its part of i0 and
i0and j are left-end equivalent.) Therefore, by the Dichotomy axiom on
L, we have L(k; n); whence Betw(m0; k; n), with both m0; n  i0 but
k  i0, contradicting that i0 is an interval.
Theorem 3 (Trichotomy) For any two intervals, i; j; either jij = jjj or
jij < jjj or jij > jjj :
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 1 and the denitions of the disjuncts.
One further axiom on congruence is useful and intuitively intended,
viz. that congruence respects nominalistic summation of adjacent inter-
vals:
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7. Additivity: Given intervals i; j; i0; j0 such thatAdj(i; j); Adj(i0; j0);
Cong(i; i0); Cong(j; j0), then Cong(k; k0); where k = i+j and k0 = i0+j0:
Now to guarantee the bi-innitude of G, we adopt the following ax-
iom:.
Theorem 4 (Bi-Innity of G) Let any interval i be given; then there
exist exactly two intervals, j; k; such that Cong(i; j) & Cong(i; k) &
Adj(i; j) & Adj(i; k) & one of j; k is left of i and the other is right of
i:
Proof. Given an interval i, by denition it is bounded, so there exists
regions that are left of i and regions that are right of i. Assume a
region m to (say) the right of i. (The case to the left is handled exactly
analogously.) If Adj(m; i), then, by the Translation axiom, there is a
unique interval j such that Cong(j; i) and j is left-end equivalent with
m. If not-Adj(m; i); then let f be the fusion of all intervals p such that
Betw(i; p;m). f is an interval. Then, by Translation, there is a unique
interval j with Cong(i; j) and j left-end equivalent to f: Combinig this
with the analogous argument for the case to the left of i completes the
proof.
Since bi-extension obviously iterates, this already insures that G is
bi-innitein the sense of containing as part the fusion of the minimal
closure of any interval i under the operation of bi-extensiondened
in the theorem. (This closure is proved to exist in Lemma 3, below.)
But we can do better and also insure that G is exhausted by iterating
the process of anking a given interval by two congruent ones as in Bi-
innity. This is just the Archimedean property, derived below. Toward
this end, call an interval l an (immediate) bi-extension of interval i
BiExt(l; i); or biext(i) = l just in case l = j+i+k, where j; i; k behave
as in the Bi-innity theorem.
Lemma 2 Let i and j be intervals such that i < j; then :Cong(i; j):
Proof. For a contradiction, assume Cong(i; j). There are three possible
cases: (1) i is left-end equivalent to j; (2) i is right-end equiv. to j; (3)
i is neither. Cases (1) and (2) are argued in exactly the same way. For
deniteness, assume case (1). By Bi-innity, there exists i0 extending
i to the left with Cong(i0; i) and Adj(i0; i), hence Adj(i0; j). But then,
by the hypothesis for reductio and transitivity of Cong, it follows that
both i and j qualify as the unique right extension of i0; as required
by Bi-innity, and since, by hypothesis of the Lemma, i 6= j, this is a
contradiction. Case (2) is argued exactly analogously, considering i0 as
extending i to the right.
8
In case (3), let kL be the fusion of all parts x of j such that L(x; i)
and let kR be the fusion of all parts x of j such that R(x; i): kL and
kR are intervals. (Easy exercise.) Clearly, kL + i + kR = j and this
sum is discrete (all three pairs discrete). Now, let j0 be (say) the right
extension of j; i.e. Cong(j0; j) and Adj(j0; j): By Translation, let i0 sat-
isfy Cong(i0; i) with i0 left-end equivalent to j0:By Translation again, let
k0L satisfy Cong(kL; k
0
L) and Adj(i
0; k0L) with L(i
0; k0L); and let k
0
R sat-
isfy Cong(kR; k0R) and Adj(k
0
L; k
0
R) with L(k
0
L; k
0
R): Then by Additivity,
Cong(j; i0 + k0L + k
0
R), so, by the uniqueness of (right) extension of j as
required by Bi-innity, we have j0 = i0+k0L+k
0
R, whence i
0 < j0, whence
i0 6= j0, but then both j0 and i0 qualify as the unique right extension of
j; a contradiction.
Now we can characterize G. Toward that, let X be any class of
intervals such that an arbitrary but xed interval i  G is one of the X
and such that if k = biext(j) for j any of the intervals of X; then k is
also in X: Call such X a closure of i under biext.
Lemma 3 By axiom 2, there is an individual which is the common part
of the fusions of each class X which is a closure of i under biext, which
we call their meet or the minimal closure i* of i under biext. (Since i is
stipulated to belong to any such X, the meet is non-null, as required in
mereology.)
Proof. Immediate from axiom 2.
Given a xed unitinterval, i, we dene the right-halfor postive
half i+ of i as the fusion of i and all intervals j such that R(j; i):
Then we dene the left-halfor negative halfof i as the fusion of all
intervals j such that L(j; i):
By the criterion for identity of mereological objects, the meet i of
Lemma 3 is unique. We now can prove a theorem characterizing G as
this meet:
Theorem 5 (Characterization of G): Let G be the fusion of the objects
in the range of the quantiers of our axioms; then G = i*, the fusion of
the minimal closure of i under biext:
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that G 6= i*. Since, by stipulation,
i  G and G is closed under biext; we have that i* < G: Then some part
p; indeed (by axiom 5) an interval k  G satsies 8j[Int(j) ^ j  i*!
L(k; j)]_8j[Int(j ^ j  i*! R(k; j]; therefore, by denition, L(k; i*) _
R(k; i*). Lets suppose its R(k; i*). (The other case is argued exactly
analogously.) Let i+designate the positive or right half of i*. Clearly
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i+ is connected; and by our betweenness criterion, it is also "bounded",
so an interval. Therefore, by the Translation axiom, there is a unique
interval m  i+ with the properties (1) m is right-end-equivalent to i+,
and (2) Cong(m; i): But this leads to contradiction, as follows: Note that
i+ consists of the fusion of class K satisfying (i) i is in K and (ii) if j is
in K, then there is a unique j0 adjacent and right of j with Cong(j0; i)
and j0 belongs to K, and (iii) for any other K 0 satisfying (i) and (ii),
K  K 0. Now regarding the relationship between m and K, there are
four cases to consider: (a) All the K are to the left of m; (b) Adjacent
to m on the left is one of the K; (c) One of the K call it h properly
includes m, i.e. m < h; or (d) One of the K call it h overlaps m but
neither is proper part of the other. Case (a) is ruled out since then i+
then runs out before reaching m, contradicting that m  +. In case
(b), it follows that m itself is one of the K; but then another, h0, is in
K, hence h0  i+ with Cong(h0; i) and R(h0;m), but this is impossible
because of property (1) of m above. In case (c), since both m and h
are congruent to i, this contradicts Lemma 2 above that, if j < k; then
:Cong(j; k): (Also, then there would be h0 in K and extending h to the
right, contradicting that m is right-end equivalent to i+.) Finally, in
case(d), some h0, in fact with R(h0; h) and Adj(h0; h); is in K, and h0
< m but both m and h0 are congruent to i, again contradicting Lemma
2. Thus each of the four cases implies a contradiction, which shows that
the assumption of such m, hence of a k  G  i*, must be wrong. Thus,
taking account of the exactly parallel argument for the left (negative)
half of * , it follows that G = i*.8
Finally, we need a guarantee that any interval has a unique bisection.
But that can now be proved as a theorem:
Theorem 6 (Existence and uniqueness of bi-sections): Given any inter-
val i, there exist intervals j; k such that j < i & k < i & jjk & j+k = i
& Cong(j; k); and j; k are unique with these properties.
Proof. Let i be any interval. For any interval j, let j+r be the fusion
of j and the right bi-extension of j. So we need to nd an interval
j that is left-end-equivalent with i such that i = j+r. Let k be any
interval such that k < i. Without loss of generality, assume that k is
8Note that this result, expressing that G is Archimedean, is quite surprising as no
axiom explicitly contains an extremal clause to the e¤ect that the intervals of G
are only those that are part of the fusion of those obtained by repeated applications
of biext starting with a given interval. Nor do we have an induction axiom for
properties of intervals, although, of course, in light of Theorem 3, such an induction
principle could be derived from mathematical induction based on an N-structure.
Alternatively, one could derive that from properties of minimal closures, à la Frege.
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left-endequivalent with i. We have that i  k exists, and is an interval.
If k is congruent with i   k, we are done. So suppose not. Either jkj
< ji   kj or ji   kj< jkj. Let l be an interval that is congruent to the
smaller of those two and is left-end-equivalent with i. So l+r  i. (In fact
l+r < i). Now let j be the fusion of all intervals m such that m is left-
end-equivalent with i and m+r  i. Clearly j+r  i. If j+r = i, we are
done. So suppose that j+r < i. Let n = i  j+r . Then n is an interval.
Let p be an interval such that p < n and, without loss of generality,
suppose that p is left-end equivalent to n. Let q be n  p. Without loss
of generality, assume that either jpj = jqj or jpj < jqj. So p+r  n. Let j0
be the fusion of j and an interval congruent to p immediately on its right.
(First let p1 be congruent with p and right-end-equivalent with j. Then
let p2 be the right bi-extension of p1.Then j0 = j+p2.) An application of
Additivity shows that j0+r = j+r + p+r, and we have j+r + p+r  i:This
contradicts the denition of j as the fusion of all intervals m such that
m is left-end-equivalent with i and m+r  i:
For uniqueness, given interval i, suppose both i = jL + jR with
Cong(jL; jR) and Adj(jL; jR), and also i = kL + kR with Cong(kL; kR)
and Adj(kL; kR), with neither jL nor jR = kL or kR. Suppose without
loss that kL < jL(and so jR < kR). Let m = jL kL. Then jR+m = kR,
whence Cong(jR +m; kL). Now let m0 be congruent to m and adjacent
to m to its right. Then Cong(jR m0; kL). But we have jR m0 < jR <
jR +m = kR (where jR is discrete from m). Since Cong(jR  m0; kR),
this contradicts our lemma that if i < j, then :Cong(i; j).
By repeated application of bi-sections, we can, in e¤ect, approximate
any locus along G to within any desired accuracy with su¢ ciently many
nested intervals, whose least after k subdivisions is of norm 2 k assuming
the initial unit interval i is of norm 1. (Here we are speaking in our
metalanguage, not yet having reconstructed the norm function in our
object language.) One natural strategy that now suggests itself is to de-
ne an exact locus or pointas a Cauchy sequenceof such decreasing
intervals. As a warm-up example, let us construct an endpoint say the
left for a given arbitrary interval i: That will simply be the set of all
subintervals j of i obtained by successive subdivisions into equal parts
such that for all j; there is no p < i such that L(p, j): In point-based
1-dimensional geometry, if we arbitrarily set the left-endpoint of i = 0,
this corresponds to the Cauchy sequence: < 1
2k
>; k = 1; 2; :::n:::; con-
verging to 0. Indeed, we can introduce 0in exactly this way: let i be an
arbitrary but xed interval, oriented as just described. Then 0 =df
T
[all
sets S containing i and containing the left half of any subinterval j of i
such that j 2 S]: Similarly, we could dene 1, replacing left(L) with
right(R). (Below, however, we give a denition in terms of Cauchy
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sequences of intervals increasing to the right, in conformity to the rest
of the positive half of G:) Notice that these objects, whether thought
of as numbers or as points, are not claimed to be parts of G: On the
contrary, they are part of a superstructure that we construct over the
mereological-interval structure of G:
In general, we dene a sequence < ji > of intervals increasing to
the right (or left, for negative reals) to be Cauchy just in case, for any
interval, "; there exists N such that for any m > k > N , jm   jk is an
interval, R(jm  jk; jk); and jjm   jkj < j"j :(This last expression was de-
ned contextually above. By assumption that < ji > is increasing to the
right, jm  jk exists and R(jm  jk; jk):Similarly for sequences increasing
to the left. Note the role of axiom 5, guaranteeing that arbitrarily small
intervals are values of ":)
By repeated application of Bi-innity and Translation, we can always
avail ourselves of Cauchy interval sequences s = < sj > increasing to the
right, beginning with our xed unit interval, i; for positive reals (to the
left, beginning with  i for negative reals), i.e. such that R(sk+1 sk; sk)
(L(sk+1   sk; sk)); the fusion of all the intervals sj forms an interval.9
This proves convenient in giving a second representation of real numbers
as intervals in G itself, which in turn as we shall see below augments
the reach of reconstructions that dont rely on set theory. Thus, we will
have available two relative interpretations of the classical continuum, R,
based on G: (1) equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of intervals of
G, or canonical ones from each class; and (2) fusions of canonical Cauchy
interval sequences, as just indicated.
Well return to (2) below. First, let us pursue (1) in some more
detail. We want to construct the reals over the xed interval i already
associated with [0,1]. The rst step is to identify the binary rationals
as the appropriate subintervals left-endpoint-equivalent to i; obtained
by iterated subdivisions licensed by the Bisection axiom. Thus, each
rational of the form n
2k
, where n = 1; 2; :::; 2k 1; corresponds 1-1 with the
left-endpoint-equivalent subintervals of i determined by the kth stage
of bisections. (The reader will have noted that the full binary tree of
Baire space is in e¤ect generated by these subdivisions.) The next step
is to identify arbitrary reals in (0; 1] with increasing Cauchy sequences
of these subintervals.10
9Since we dont recognize a null interval, 0 is conventionally dened either as above
or as a right-ward proceeding (nested) sequence starting with an interval, call it   i2 ;
congruent to the left half of i, choosing at each stage, k, the right half subinterval of
  i
2k 1 :
10Of course, sequences may omit both left and right subintervals at a given stage,
corresponding to a 0in the binary numeral representation of the real in question.
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The natural ordering of the binary subintervals of i implicit above is
this: j  k $df k   j exists (is non-null) & R(k   j; j):
The next step is to extend this ordering to the increasing Cauchy
sequences of intervals. We set < ri >  < si > just in case 9"9N8k >
N [" an interval & jsk   rkj > j"j & R(sk  rk; rk) (Recall that the norm-
notation was dened contextually using Cong, above.)
3 Recovering R
The pieces are now in place to prove a rst recovery theorem:
Theorem 7: The ordered structure of binary intervals wthin i together
with the Cauchy sequences of them is order-isomorphic to the classical
real numbers of (0; 1] (in their natural ordering, <).
Proof. There is a 1-1 invertible map ' from the binary intervals of
i to the binary rationals of (0; 1]: Dene ' as follows: Set ' of the
left interval, call it i
2
; of i resulting from the 1st subdivision = 1
2
; af-
ter the kth subdivision, set ' of the left-most = 1
2k
; of the next left-
most = 2
2k
; ..., of the next to right-most = 2
k 1
2k
: (' of the right-most
is of course always = 1.)11 Clearly ' is order-preserving. To extend
this to the increasing Cauchy interval sequences, map each such, of the
form < s1; s2; :::; sn::: > to the increasing rational Cauchy sequence
determined by '; viz. < '(s1); '(s2); :::; '(sn); ::: > : Call this exten-
sion of ' '0: That '0 is 1-1 and onto the increasing binary rational
Cauchy sequences is immediate from the properties of ': That '0 is
order-preserving is also clear: if < rk >  < sk >, then beyond some N
(given in the denition of this ordering, above), 9n such that the cor-
responding rational di¤erences, '(sm)   '(rm) > 2 n; for any m > N;
which denes order on these rational sequences.
Now we can extend this to the whole positive half-line, (0;1) by
applying the same procedure to right-extensions of i by any number of
intervals each congruent with i: E.g. we map the interval i + j; where
Cong(i; j) & Adj(i; j) & R(j; i) to (0; 2] (appealing to the Bi-innity
theorem), iterating this procedure to cover all intervals of the form (0; n]:
Thus, we have:
11Since, e.g., 2
2k
= 1
2k 1 ; etc., it appears that ' is many-one; but really it isnt as
the the result of proceeding stepwise to the right simply adds a congruent interval
adjacent to the preceding, so that the result is an interval, and in the case of an even
number of steps, it is always = an interval obtained at an earlier subdivision. E.g. in
one rightward step at the kth subdivision, we get left-most- i
2k
+ next-left-most- i
2k
=
left-most- i
2k 1 ; etc. (where the +here is mereological summation).
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Corollary 1 The theorem statement holds for all intervals of the form
(0; n]; hence for the whole positive part G+ of G as order-isomorphic to
the positive reals, (0;1):
Proof. The only thing to check, in addition to what has already been
established, is that the map just introduced call it '00 from G+ to
(0;1) is indeed dened on all of G+ in the sense that no part p  G+
is discrete from all the intervals on which '00 is dened. Suppose, to
the contrary, there is some such part, p: Then p must be discrete from
each binary rational interval left-end equivalent to i, and in particular
discrete from any of the intervals obtained from i by any nite number of
applications of the biext operation introduced above. But then p would
be discrete from the fusion of all such intervals, which fusion = exactly
the meet (= minimal closure of i under biext) that we proved = G in
Theorem 5, above. This contradicts that p  G+:
Corollary 2 The theorem statement holds for all intervals of the form
[ n; 0]; hence for the whole negative part G  of G as order-isomorphic
to the non-positive reals, ( 1; 0]:
Proof. Applying Translation and Bi-innity, the constructions for the
positive part of G can be shifted accordingly. (For the sake of the eld
operations, introduced below, it is simplest to reect the positive inter-
vals about 0, i.e. proceeding leftward starting with  i or subdivisions
thereof.) The proof that the mirror imageof the map '00 is dened on
all of G  is exactly analogous to the proof of the rst Corollary that '00
is dened on all of G+:
To extend the isomorphisms of the Corollaries to cover the whole of G
simply stipulate that, for every interval j of the negative part of G and
every interval k of the positive part, j  k:Thus we have established:
Theorem 8: G (i.e. (G;) ) is order isomorphic to R (ordered by <).
Call the isomorphism of the latter theorem :
With respect to the eld-algebraic structure of R, we can proceed in
either of two ways. (1) We could regard it as additional structure of R,
built up in the usual way from the Cauchy seqences dening the reals,
not bothering about any additional structure of G; or (2) we can intro-
duce operations of additionand multiplicationof intervals of G and
prove that the order-isomorphism  is also an algebraic isomorphism.
(2) is more interesting so let us pursue it. To dene an interval sum
operation, call it i j; we can rst dene this for binary intervals;which
we can already express as  1(q); for q a binary rational of R, where
such an interval is either left-end-equivalent to i, if q > 0; or right-end
equivalent to  i; if q < 0; where  i is the interval satisfying Cong(i; i)
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& Adj(i; i) & R(i; i):Then  will simply be vector-addition along
G:  is then extended to all of R by applying it pointwiseto inverse
images under  of the (binary) rational Cauchy sequences dening the
reals in queston. To obtain "multiplicationof intervals, i
 j; either of
two method may be used. Remaining entirely within G, we rst dene
this product for inverse images of binary rationals as iterated interval-
addition, ; treating binary fractions of intervals in accordance with the
distributive law of multiplication over addition.12 Then 
 is extended
to all of R by applying it pointwiseto inverse images under  of the
rational Cauchy sequences dening the reals in question. Alternatively,
we can adapt the establshed Euclidean geometric method of introduc-
ing product of two lengths by working in the Euclidean plane. Here, of
course, we work in G  G, diagrammatically representing one copy of
G as our abcissa, the other as ordinate, such that the left end of our
unit, i, is the origin, where the two axes cross.13 Then the product j
k
is obtained by taking j as left-end equvalent to i along the abcissa, k
as extending from the origin along the ordinate (either up if we are
operating on +k; or downif we are operating on  k): Next we con-
struct the hypotenuse segment  connecting the right-end of i with
the top-end of k (if were consider j 
 +k, bottom-end of k if its
j 
  k). The value of the product is then represented as the interval
m along the ordinate from the origin to where the segment, call in 0;
meets the ordinate, where 0 extends from the right-end of j and lies
parallel to : (0 forms a second hypotenuse, so we have two similar
triangles. Then the denition of product derives directly from the fact
that jmjjkj =
jjj
1
:)14 Now the denition of the operation 
 is extended to
all of R via rational Cauchy sequences, as in the rst method.
Recalling that  1(0) was introduced via a rational-interval Cauchy
sequence, one checks that the algebraic laws of the eld operations are
preserved under : Thus, we have
Theorem 9: G (G;;;
) is ordered-eld isomorphic to R (R;<
;+; ).
12E.g.,  1(2:5) 
  1(3:25) is computed by vectorially adding twice the (unit)
interval i and half-i, call this 2:5i; and then vectorially tripling this and adding a
quarter of 2:5i to obtain the answer.
13Justifying this method on the present pointless basis would require adopting
some further primitives and axioms to extend our methods to the Euclidean plane.
We would need further equivalence relations of end-equivalenceto replace reference
to the point where two non-collinear intervals meet; and we would need a relation
of angle-congruence for purposes of constructing paralells. All this will be carried
out in further work on two-dimensional continua.
14Note that were now in a position to dene the norm, jjj ; for any interval j;
based on the isomorphism :
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Although these isomorphism theorems rely on the characterization
theorem (5) of G, which already expresses that G is Archimedean, it
is worth pointing out that Theorem 9 implies that G satises a state-
ment of the Archimedean property closer to the one commonly given for
R. Here is one way to formulate this. As will be suggested below, as-
sume as part of our mereological universe a natural-numbers-structure,
N ; constituted entirely of atoms, which we designate 0N ; 1N ; 2N ; :::.15
Then we can speak of functions from N (0;+N ; N) to intervals of G
by quantifying plurally over (unordered) pairs, (n; j) =df n + j (where
this is nominalistic summing). Now inductively dene a map ' : N !
Intervals of G via
(i) '(0N) = i
(ii) '(nN +N 1N) = biext('(nN)):
Now dene `i divides k (mod 3)to mean: k = '(mN); some mN : Then
we say G is Archimedean just in case
8j9h[j an interval ! h an interval & i divides h (mod 3) & j  h]:
Thus we have
Corollary G is Archimedean.
Proof. This follows from the Characterization Theorem on G as the
minimal closure of i under biext. For a contradiction, suppose that some
interval j  G is not covered by any interval h obtained by iterating
biext, starting with i, any nite number of times. Then, by construction
of G, for some j0  j, j0jG; so j  G, contradiction. (Cf. the proofs of
Corollaries 1 and 2, via the denedness of the maps described there.)
Finally, we would like to be assured that the above development of R
over G is independent of the starting interval, i, i.e. that starting with
any other, j, leads to essentially the same recovery theorems, and even
that the minimal closure of j under biextension is indeed G itself. That
can be arrived at as follows.
Let j be any interval of G other than i:Now minimally close j under
biextension, calling the result j*: Then we proceed in two steps: (1) We
can carry out the whole of the above construction to produce an ordered-
eld isomorphism 0 from the binary intervals and Cauchy sequences
thereof between G0 and R;where G0 and 0 are introduced just as G and
 were but substituting reference to j for that to i throughout. (Think
of a transformation of the interval structure of G based on i combining
a suitable translation and either a shrinking, in case jjj < jij ; or a
15This can itself be carried out along lines of Hellman (1996) but ignoring modal
operators for present purposes.
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stretching, in case jij < jjj, or neither, if Cong(i; j):) Step (2) consists
of demonstrating that, in light of (1), the point-free continuum G0 = j*
based on j is indeed = G: That makes essential use of the Archimedean
property of G0, a¤orded by carrying out the proof of the last Corollary
with G0 in place of G, mutatis mutandis.
Theorem 10: The point-free continuum G0 = j* based on interval j
( G and  G0) = G:
Proof. By denition of G as minimal closure of i under biextension,
G0  G: For since, by hypothesis, j  G, we have that for some nite
n, j  biextn(i), i.e. j is part of the result of the nth iterate of biext
applied to i: Then it is straightforward to show that any k covered by
nitely many applications of biext starting with j is also covered by
nitely many applications of biext starting with i:We need to show the
converse, that G  G0: First we claim that i  G0: This follows from the
Archimedean condition displayed above, applied to G0, interchanging the
roles of iand jto produce an h ( G0) such that i  h: Next we argue
by induction that any interval k obtained from i by repeated application
of the biextension operation will be accessible from j in the same sense
as i is, i.e. by appealing again to the Archimedean condition above for
G0, substituting kfor jand jfor `i. Then, from the denition of G,
since every intervalm of G is covered by the result of some nite number
of iterations of biextension based on i, it follows from the induction that
m  G0, as well, whence G  G0; and therefore G0 = G:
4 Topological Models
We now present two topological models for our axiomatization.
These illustrate some of the Aristotelian notions of contiguity and con-
tinuity.16 The exercise will also serve to remove any lingering doubts
concerning the consistency of our axiomatization, if there are any.
For both models, the backgroundmeta-theory is the ordinary, Dedekind-
Cantor account of the real numbers, with their usual topological proper-
ties. An open set S of real numbers is said to be regular if S is identical
to the interior of its closure.17
Dene a real number r to be an interior boundary of a set S, if
r =2 S, but there are numbers s; t such that s < r < t and the open set
16For a discussiion and comparison of these concepts, see Hellman and Shapiro
[2012].
17Cartwright [1975] argues that in 3-space, all and only regular open sets are
receptacles, regions of space that physical objects can occupy. Cartwrights theory
is at least partly Aristotelian.
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(s; t) frg is a subset of S. So, for example, the number 1 is an interior
boundary of the union of (0; 1) and (1; 2). Regular open sets are those
open sets that have no interior boundaries.
The domain of our rst model consists of all non-empty, regular
open sets of real numbers. The parthood relation is just the subset
relation, as might be expected. Let  be a non-empty set (or plurality)
of non-empty, regular sets. Dene SUM() to be the interior of the
closure of the union of . This is the fusion relation. So to get the
fusion of a set of regions in our model, rst take the union of the sets,
then the closure of the result, and then the interior of that. The result
is, again, a regular, open set. And it is straightforward to verify that
our Axiom 2, of fusion (or whole comprehension) is satised:
,
(8ww)(9x)(8y)[y  x$ (9z)(z  ww ^ z  y)]
:
This model nicely recapitulates some of Aristotles account of
continuous objects. Consider, again, the intervals (0; 1) and (1; 2). Those
are contiguous, since there is nothing of the same kind in between
them. Indeed, there are no members of our domain in between. The
only thing betweenthem is the real number 1, and f1g is, of course,
not a regular open set. These two intervals are also continuous, in
Aristotles sense, since when we put them together when we take their
sum we obtain the interval (0; 2). That is, the boundarydisappears
and they become a single interval, a unity.
The proper denitions of the other primitives in our axiomati-
zation are as straightforward as can be. Recall that L(x; y) intuitively
means that the region x is entirely to the left of y. Let X and Y be non-
empty, regular open sets of real numbers. Then dene X to be LEFT
of Y just in case every member of X is smaller than every member of
Y . It is trivial to verify that the relevant axioms are satised.
Recall that an intervalis dened to be a connected, bounded
region. In the model, the intervalsare just the open intervals, (a; b),
with a < b. And, of course, the Gunkiness axiom 5 is also trivial:
(8x)(9j)(Int(j) ^ j < x):
The notion of left-end-equivalenceis also straightforward. Two inter-
vals are left-end-equivalent just in case they have the same left endpoint.
And, of course, congruenceof regions is dened to be congruence of
regular, open sets. Verifying the remaining axioms is also trivial.
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Our second topological model is a sort of dual to the rst, as its
domain consists of certain closed sets of real numbers. It is, in one
sense, a little more Aristotelian, since it does allow that intervals have
endpoints although these endpoints are not regions in the domain.
Say that a set S of real numbers is regular closed if S is identical
to the closure of its interior. A real number r is an isolated point of a
set B if r 2 B, and there are numbers s; t such that s < r < t and the
open set (s; t) frg is disjoint from B. So, for example, 1 is an isolated
point of f1g, and also of the union of f1g with [2; 3]. Regular closed sets
have no isolated points.
The domain of our second model is the set of non-empty, regu-
lar closed sets of real numbers. As with our rst model, the parthood
relation is the subset relation. If  is a non-empty set of non-empty
regular closed sets, dene the SUM of  to be the closure of union of
. It is straightforward to verify that this SUM is regular closed, and
that Axiom 2 of fusion is satised.
Perhaps this model better captures the Aristotelian notion of
continuous objects. The sum of [0; 1] and [1; 2] is, of course, [0; 2]. Here
the boundary point(s) of the contiguous intervals is absorbedinto the
sum.
With this model, we must be a little more careful when char-
acterizing some of the relations in our theory, even the dened ones.
Consider, for example, the two closed intervals [0; 1] and [1; 2], both of
which are in our model. As sets, those are not disjoint, as they have
a member, 1, in common. Recall, however, that in our denition of
overlap:
x  y $ (9z)(z  x ^ z  y);
the quantier ranges over the regions in the model. So [0; 1] does not
overlap [1; 2], since there is no member of the domain no regular closed
set that is a part of (i.e., a subset of) both. The regions are indeed
discrete. In our second model, intervals bounded and connected
regions are closed intervals [a; b].
Let A be the union of [0; 1]; [2; 3]; [4; 5];. . .; and let B be the
union of [1; 2]; [3; 4]; [5; 6], . . . Then A does not overlap B they are
discrete even though their intersection, as sets, is innite.
Our denition of Left is similarly nuanced. If A and B are
regular closed sets, then dene A to be LEFT of B just in case for
every r in A and every s in B, either r < s, or both r = s and r is a
boundary of both. So [0; 1] is to the left of [1; 2]. It is trivial to verify
that the axioms of our theory are all satised in this second model.
This second model does have some rather strange or, at least
intuitively un-Aristotelian regions. Consider the union of the closed
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intervals [:1; :9], [:01; :09], [:001; :009], . . . and f0g. This set is regular
closed, and so is a region in our model. However, it has an actual innity
of discrete parts and a sort of loose point f0g at its left end.
5 Interlude: A Brief Dialogue
Objection: If this is really coherent, it would indeed reënforce that non-
punctiform and indecomposable are very di¤erent attributes as ap-
plied to continua.18 But the connection between them may be greater
than the above seems to imply. Indeed, one may question whether it
really makes sense to say of G that it has any proper parts at all! Lets
take your interval i: You suppose that it makes sense to speak of i and
its negate, Neg( i) = G   i: But consider the question of the two places
where i meetsNeg( i): Do they touch there? Surely there must be a
point at each of those places, either as part of i itself or of Neg( i). But
of course, as your system allows, i can be shifted anywhere along G so
that any place can serve as a boundary of an interval, in which case G
is composed of points after all.
Reply: It is indeed part of the standard punctiform conception that
boundaries of (bounded) intervals must exist, and then they must be part
of one or the other of an interval and its complement.19 But the above
theory ofGmakes sense on the basis of a di¤erent conception. According
to it, lets consider your question, whether i and Neg(i) touch. Well,
we dont make sense of that, except to say that, if you mean, Is there
anything in between i and Neg( i)?, the answer is clearly no; and this
is perfectly compatible with the two parts not overlapping. After all,
a very similar thing happens in the case of your Dedekind cuts in the
rationals used to dene irrational numbers: the lower and upper sections
are disjoint (the set-theoretic analogue of our discrete), yet there is no
boundary in the sense of an lub of the lower section or a glb of the
upper, until by at one is introduced by dening it to be the cut (or a
section thereof) itself! We all know and love this move by Dedekind,
and we know how well it works. But that move does not establish that
a corresponding point really exists (was there all along) on any actual
18In the opposite direction, the intuitionistic continuum is indecomposablebut,
in some sense of point, is entirely composed of points. Although not all pairs of reals
are orderable (so that exact locationcannot be attributed), still they are speced
with innite precision relative to the everywhere dense rationals.
19It seems also to have been Aristotles conception that breakinga line segment
results in (or actualizes) boundary points, endpoints of two new sbintervals. This
may in fact have been Aristotles notion of indecomposability. In that case, note
how di¤erent it is from the intuitionistic conception. There, breaking a continuum re-
sults in a loss (some syrup sticking to the knife, as it were), whereas, on Aristotles
conception, the result is an addition (of endpoints) to the structure.
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1-dimensional continuum (if there are any), much less on any that can
be coherently conceived. And it is simply not a move that we are forced
to make, either on conceptual or on practical grounds. Instead, we can,
if we like, carry out a Dedekind style construction as a superstructure
over G, preserving all the advantages of classical analysis while resisting
the attribution of a point-ontology.
Objection: The analogy with Dedekind cuts (for irrationals) is awed:
Your G is supposed to model a continuum, so the analogue of a division
of G into two discrete yet adjacent parts would be a Dedekind cut in the
reals, not in the rationals. But the Dedekind continuum is complete, so
there are no cuts in the reals without the corresponding real belonging to
one segment or the other. This shows, does it not, that e.g. your Bi-
section axiom really makes no sense unless a point is added at the place
where the two parts meet.
Reply: Agreed, the analogy is imperfect; still, imperfect analogies
can be of heuristic value. But it doesnt follow that points need to be
added where [the] two parts meet, for, as we said above, where they
meetis language belonging to the Cantor-Dedekind theories of a point-
ful continuum, but it is foreign language that cant really be translated
into the theory of G: Point-like placessimply are not recognized; that
is the point! Yes, they can be introduced as superstructure, as shown
above, but that doesnt require revising the description of G, or thinking
that reallythe points are thereon G: Just as we can say that two
people believe in the same god(s) without thereby implying that there
exist god(s) in which they both believe, so we can speak (as we have spo-
ken) of two intervalsbeing, say, left-end equivalentwithout thereby
implying that there is a special further entity called the left end (as a
point)shared by both segments. Even in cases where abstraction based
on an equivalence relation may be reasonable and useful, e.g. as when
we speak of income levelsbased on personsor familiessharing simi-
lar enough incomes, that doesnt mean at least, without much further
argument that we have to recognize income levelsas entities or that
it is somehow incoherent not to.
6 Non-set-theoretic versions
There were two main places in the above reconstruction where set theory
seemed to play an indisepnsable role: (1) in the use of Cauchy sequences
of binary intervals; and (2) in the use of isomorphisms between G and R.
In the latter case, appeal to set theory is, in a sense, not really problem-
atic with regard to the autonomy of the interval structure of G, since,
after all, were reasoning about the relation of that structure to that of
the classical continuum, which is fundamentally set-theoretic. The rst
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case, however, is problematic, as the autonomy of G is threatened by
reliance on enough set theory to build up R, with its ontology of points,
etc. Is there an alternative way of introducing interval sequences that
improves on this?
Indeed there is. All that is needed is to expand the theory of G by
specifying that, additional to G but entirely discrete from it, there is a
denumerable innity of mereological atoms that form a natural-numbers
structure (N-structure). That is readily expressed with mereology and
plural quantication. (Cf. e.g. Hellman [8].) Now the role of ordered
pairs of the form < n; j >; where n is an atom of the N-structure and j is
an binary rational interval of G; can be served by the (unordered) mere-
ological sum, n+ j:20 Plurally quantifying over such things then enables
plurally quantifying over binary rational interval sequences. Those that
satisfy the Cauchy convergence condition serve as our reals. The upshot
is that, now, we bypass set theory entirely in the development of our G-
interval structure, even to the extent of being able to carry out a great deal
of classical analysis without even recognizing real numbers as objects! In-
stead of speaking of reals as individual objects, we quantify plurally over
the increasing binary rational Cauchy interval sequences corresponding
to them (as their limit points, on standard classical theory). This ful-
lls at least the non-punctiform aspect of the Aristotelian conception
of contiua in a clearly non-parasitic way. Points arent introduced at
all; rather, their mathematical roles are performed by surrogates within
the thoroughly non-punctiform framework of G: We can even claim to
capture Aristotles idea that points exist only potentially, since, as
already seen, we can introduce real numbers or points as objects serving
as the limits of our converging interval sequences, but that is not forced
on us.
But, in order to make good on this last claim, it needs to be checked
that at least a good portion of classical analysis can indeed be con-
structed within the G-framework (with plural quantication but no set
theory, as just described). In particular, how are we to reconstruct quan-
tication over functions from reals to reals if we can only plurally quan-
tify over Cauchy interval sequences. This is no problem so long as our
functions are continuous (or at least continuous on a co-countable do-
main of reals). The key here is that continuous functions are determined
20Although the intervals of G already allow encoding of natural numbers and the
arithmetic operations, representation of sequences of intervals and other functions
within a nominalist framework becomes cumbersome at best, since a stock of intervals
would be serving two roles at once, that of natural numbers and that of items of
sequences. Such problems are bypassed by positing an atomic N-structure discrete
from G:
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by their behavior at rational arguments. Now binary rationals are avail-
able directly as intervals. Suppose we have a sequence of all these rep-
resenting rationals in the domain of denition of f , i.e. we refer plurally
to countably many individuals of the form < n; j >, as dened above.
A continuous function f assigns each of these a real value, represented
over G as a Cauchy interval sequence, f(< n; j >) = fn+j1 ; f
n+j
2 ; :::Now
we would like to code all these (countably many) Cauchy interval se-
quences as a single interval sequence (which itself, of course, need not
be convergent it merely serves to encode the behavior of f at rational
arguments, enumerated in an arbitrary fashion). One convenient way
is to work with just the atoms n of the < n; j > serving in the enu-
meration of rational intervals, coding the (set-theoretic) ordered-pair
< n; f(< n; j >) > as the sequence n + fn+j1 ; n + f
n+j
2 ; :::Then the re-
striction f  Q of f to rationals can be coded up in a single sequence by a
dove-tailing construction on the countably many sequences of this latter
form.21 In this way, we bring continuous and co-countably continuous
functions within the purview of plural quantication of the language of
the G-interval structure.
With one more reductive step, we can improve further on this to bring
also the isomorphism recovery theorems within the purview of the theory
of G (or its expanded version, providing for an atomic N-structure).
Instead of recovering real numbers as Cauchy interval sequences, we
can avail ourselves of the second relative interpretation of R over G
referred to above, toward the end of section 2, viz representing reals
as certain intervals of G; viz. fusions of the right-(or left-) increasing
Cauchy interval sequences introduced above. Here is how this helps
in representing the isomorphisms of the recovery theorems without set-
theoretic machinery.
As in the non-set-theoretic reconstruction just sketched, we recon-
struct interval sequences via an atomic N-structure. But now instead of
treating quantication over reals as plural quantication over the wholes,
n + j; coding the (canonical) Cauchy interval sequences dening them,
instead we quantify singularly over the fusions of the intervals making
up such a sequence, which, as noted, are themselves intervals of G.
Before we can introduce functions from such real intervals of G
(as we may now call them) to reals of the classical continuum, we need
(or at least prefer) to identify a suitable target structure that is itself
not essentially set-theoretic. Here we can appeal to arithmetic methods
applied to our given N-structure. Coding signed integers +m ( m) con-
ventionally as certain pairs of naturals, e.g. as 21  3m (22  3m); and then
21This is modeled on the way countably many real numbers can be coded as a
single real number.
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rationals as (reduced) pairs of signed integers, we then have canonical
Cauchy sequences < qj > of rationals coded as number-theoretic ordered
pairs of the form < j; qj >; where qj is the number coding the rational
qj:
22 Any two distinct such sequences di¤er at some place; thus, the fu-
sion of any such sequence is just a uniquely determined whole of atoms
of our original N-structure, with di¤erent sequences yielding di¤erent
fusions. These fusions then can serve as our classical reals (which we
call reals over N). It is tedious, but routine, to dene linear ordering
and the eld operations on these.
We still need a way of representing or coding mappings between
real-intervals of G and fusions over the N-structure serving as classical
reals . First, how can we code an ordered pair of the form < k;  >;
where k is a real-interval of G and  is a (nominalistic) sum of nat-
urals (atoms of the N-structure) coding a canonical Cauchy sequence
of rationals representing a real? Well, if we stipulate that the mapping
goes in the direction k  , we can make do with an unordered pair.
But that can simply be taken as the fusion of k and , as these are
always non-overlapping, as they are from di¤erent structures, one atom-
less, the other atomic. Finally, by quantifying plurally over fusions of
this form (k + ), we achieve the e¤ect of quantifying over mappings or
functions from our G-structure to the reals over N. In this manner, we
can reconstruct the isomorphisms of the recovery theorems and prove
their required properties within our theory of G together with an atomic
N-structure, without ever using set-membership or quantifying over sets.
Finally, there is a readily available way of further reinforcing the idea
that real numbers as pointsexist only potentially: the above exten-
sion of the universe of G by an N-structure and the whole subsequent
development of an R-structure over it can be carried out under the sup-
position that such an extension is merely logically possible.23 Indeed,
even the theory of G itself can be carried out relative to the assumption
that such a mereological-interval structure is merely a logical possibil-
ity. Even so, extensions of G by further structures, e.g. an atomic
N-structure as above, are taken as further possibilities, relative to any
given hypothetical G-structure, so that the merely possiblestatus of
real numbers as points is still recognized even within a thorough-going
modal-structural treatment.
22Here, of course, j is a numerical index referring to an atom of our N-structure,
not an interval of G:
23Thus, the above development of an extension of G by an atomic N-structure,
etc., can be set in the modal-structural framework of Hellman [7], as improved in
[8] and subsequent presentations. We do not claim that this captures what Aristotle
meant by potentially innite.
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7 Comparisons with Some Other Constructions
Without attempting anything like complete coverage of alternatives al-
ready in the literature, we present some comparisons that we hope will
be instructive.
As our title states, we are concentrating on point-free constructions of
the classical continuum, R, and in further work we will develop a recovery
of RR, which extends to higher dimensions, without primitives for any
objects of lower dimension. In addition to forming the basis of classical
functional analysis, these systems can be enriched to study geometric
spaces of various sorts. So we are clearly working in the area (category)
of metric spaces, not purely topological spaces. There have, indeed,
been a number of e¤orts to develop topological spaces based on axioms
governing regions, rather than sets of points, going back at least to
work of Karl Menger.24 Our own work only touches indirectly on these
precedents, insofar as well-known topological spaces can be constructed
from R, R2,.and higher dimensions. But those are derivative from the
metrical structure of these spaces, and so arent purely topological.
Focusing, then, on point-free geometries, there is the noteworthy
reconstruction of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry by Tarski [14].
This explicitly uses (atomless) mereology, to which is added the single
primitive sphere. (In addition, the construction uses some set theory,
e.g. in the key denition of point as the set of all spheres concentric with
a given sphere, and also in recovering denitions of various kinds of sets
of points, e.g. regular open, etc.) A few clever denitions introduce
the notions sphere A is externally tangent to sphere B, sphere A
is internally tangent to sphere B, spheres A and B are externally
diametrical to sphere C, spheres A and B are internally diametrical
to sphere C, leading nally to sphere A is concentric with sphere B:
where A 6= B, and where, say A, is proper part of B; given two spheres,
X; Y; externally diametrical to A and internally tangent to B, X and
Y are also internally diametrical to B: Then point is introduced as
already explained, and then the notion of two points being equidistant
from a third is dened.
What about axioms? As his Postulate I, Tarski stipulates that The
notion of point and that of equidistant from satisfy all the postulates
of ordinary Euclidean geometry of three dimensions.Then follow three
auxiliary postulatesgoverning solids, connecting solid and part with
regular open set and inclusion. He then writes: The postulate system
given above is far from being simple and elegant; it seems very likely that
24See, e.g. Menger [11]. For further references and recent developments, see Roeper
[12] and Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak [6].
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this postulate system can be essentially simplied by using intrinsic prop-
erties of the geometry of solids.For the one-dimnesional case, that is
precisely what our system above accomplishes. We may call an approach
such as our own, in which no axioms govening even dened pointsare
listed (or, in higher dimensional cases, governing dened concepts for
any lower-dimensional objects), one of honest toil. When it comes
to two-dimensions, we will present a recovery of the key Archimedean
property meriting the honoric honest toil. Another departs from this
but only fairly modestly; we can describe this as an instance of petty
theft(rst o¢ ense). In comparison, Tarskis method seems an instance
of grand larceny. As his self-critical remark suggests, it is one thing
to show that key primitive notions can be adequately dened by terms
designating objects and relations of a given level (dimension); it is quite
another to achieve a full-scale reduction of a point-based theory by de-
riving translations of its axioms induced by the denitions as theorems
from axioms governing concepts pertaining entirely to the given level.
In fairness, it should be mentioned that, as Tarski states, his postulates
can be proved categorical, and they can be proved mutually relatively
interpretable with standard point-based Euclidean geometry. Neverthe-
less, the achievement of a full-scale reduction is clearly more desirable,
not only for the unitiy it achieves, but for establishing the autonomy
and su¢ ciency of the conceptual machinery operating at a given level or
dimension.
Much closer in content and method to the reconstructions of con-
tinua presented here is the recent work of Roeper [13], on what he calls
the Aristotelian continuum. Like the system presented above, his sys-
tem charcacterizes a linear continuum on a point-free basis in terms of
a structure of regions and intervals, and it is shown categorical and iso-
morphic to a classical, point-based continuum. The following are the
main points of comparison:
(1) Roepers axioms describe a continuum as a certain kind of region-
based topological space, connected, locally connected, second-countable,
also linearly ordered, complete, and separable. Our axioms do this but
also describe the metrical structure of an ordered eld. Thus, we have
congruence of intervals as one of our primitives, whereas Roepers system
omits this.
(2) As part of his logic, in place of mereology and logic of plurals,
Roeper uses a (rst- and second-order) logic of mass terms. Thus, where
we would express, e.g., region r is entirely to the left of region sas
any part of r is left of every part of s, Roepers language expresses r is
everywhere left of s (everywhere). Probably the two languages, as used
in these respective reconstructions of continua, that is, in the presence
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of other primitives and axioms governing them, are inter-translatable.
(3) Roeper draws heavily on region-based topology, a theory with
two non-logical primitives, limited (that is, bounded or nite in ex-
tent) and  is connected with , written  1 , intuitively meaning
either  and  overlap or they abut one another, along with thir-
teen axioms governing these, including Coherence (if  =  [ , then
 1 ), Continuity (a topological version of a least-upper-bound or
greatest-lower-bound principle), and Countable Convex Cover (akin to
Separability). It should be emphasized that these topological axioms
are not axioms of the Aristotelian continuum, but are instead (required
and shown to be) derivable therefrom. However, the two primitives just
listed are taken over in axioms 6, 7, and 8 of the latter system. Axiom 6
is essentially our denition of bounded ; axiom 7 is a version of continu-
ity; and axiom 8 is a version of separability. For purposes of describing
the classical linear continuum, we dene the two primitives, limited and
connected with: for  is limited, see the denition of boundedabove,
sec. 2; for connected, we dened Adj(r,s), r; s are adjacent, and of
course we have r  s, from mereology. Moreover, the crucial proper-
ties of coherence, continuity, and separability are not taken as axioms
of our system, but rather proved as theorems, where for the rst two
properties, we use the plurals comprehension scheme of mereology (de-
scribing minimal closures), and for the third we use the representation of
rational-length intervals via the theorem of bisectability. Regarding the
important Archimedean property, Roepers system can derive this from
its version of continuity or completeness (as standardly done in point-
based frameworks, e.g. à la Dedekind), whereas we prove this directly
from our comprehension axioms and Translation.
Indeed, we can claim more: all Roepers axioms are in fact deriv-
able as theorems in our system, under the translation just given of his
primitives, limited and connected. Thus we have a nice unication of
systems, our geometry-cum-classical analysis and Roepers regions-based
topology-cum-ordered continuum. In sum, honest toilhas paid o¤.
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